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WEAK DISCIPLINE: GATT ARTICLE XXIV
AND THE EMERGING WTO JURISPRUDENCE ON RTAs
ZAKIR HAFEZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this era of globalization, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) continue to proliferate rapidly. Today, it is no longer possible to view the
World Trade Organization (WTO) as a rule and RTAs as the exception.
Over 200 RTAs have been notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) or WTO. Currently, almost 162 RTAs are in force, most of
which have been concluded in the past ten years.' Since 1995 alone, over
100 agreements covering trade in goods or services, or both, have been notified to the WTO. Each Member of the WTO is either a participant in at
least one RTA or is seriously considering joining one. 2 And, most significantly, the two main leaders of the WTO-the United States 3 and the Euro-

" LL.M., S.J.D., The George Washington University Law School, Washington D.C. Member,
New York State Bar. Currently working with the international trade group of White & Case LLP,
Washington D.C.
I am grateful to Professor Raj Bhala, Raymond F. Rice Distinguished Professor of the University of Kansas School of Law, for carefully reviewing the draft. Also, I am grateful to Associate Dean Susan Karamanian and Professor John Ragosta of the George Washington University
Law School for their comments on the draft. All mistakes, of course, are my own.
I am indebted to the following individuals for their continuous advice and encouragement:
Edward Krauland, Thomas Graham, James Jones, Joseph Brand, John Greenwald, Saud Ammari,
Carolyn Lamm, Walter Spak, and Nassib Ziade. I also must thank Sayam Hafez, Adil Malik, Dr.
Badrunnesa Begum and Dr. Rawshan Malik for their friendship.
1. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Basic Information on Regional Trade
Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/44 (Feb. 7, 2002), availableat www.wto.org.
2. See id; see also Coming Unstuck: The Doha Round of Trade Talks is in Trouble,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2002, at 14; China and ASEAN: Still a Sea of Troubles, ECONOMIST, Nov. 9,
2002, at 58.
3. The United States has recently concluded FTAs with Chile and Singapore. It is also actively negotiating FTAs with 33 other governments to form Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA),
with Central American Common market (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua), with southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa,
and Swaziland), with Australia and Morocco. See 2003 Trade Policy Agenda and 2002 Annual
Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003.html. See Press Release, Policies in Focus, Enterprise for
ASEAN Initiative (announcing White House initiative to ultimately form an FTA with the
ASEAN) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/internationaltrade/aseaninitiative (last
visited Jan. 17, 2004); see also Edward Alden, Countries Line up to Sign US Trade Deals, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at 10.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:879

pean Communities (EC)4-are marching energetically towards expanding
their existing networks of RTAs and forming new ones.
The world would have applauded unquestionably the continued rise of
RTAs if that trend was an accurate indicator of world economic efficiency
and global welfare and if regionalism was a necessary stepping stone to
multilateralism. But in 1950, Jacob Viner in his classic The Customs Union
Issue cautioned that RTAs have both trade creating and trade diverting effects. 5 In fact, the GATT negotiators were concerned during the 1946-48
negotiations that RTAs might be used for protectionist purposes. Thus,
GATT Article XXIV did not just condone the establishment of RTAs, it
also imposed a number of disciplines on the formation of RTAs.
Unfortunately, these disciplines have been weak. Perhaps this weak
discipline is best summarized by the observation of the former Deputy Director General of GATT:
Of all the GATT articles, this is [Article XXIV] one of the most
abused, and those abuses are among the least noted. Unfortunately,
therefore, those framing any new [free trade area] need have little
fear that they will be embarrassed by some GATT body finding
them in violation of their international obligations and commitments and recommending that they abandon or alter what they are
about to do.6

During the Uruguay Round, the soon-to-be WTO Members attempted
to strengthen the disciplines in GATT Article XXIV. They rendered explicitly RTAs subject to the WTO dispute settlement system, thus creating,
namely, the Understandingon Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-

ment of Disputes (DSU). The WTO panels and the Appellate Body had already addressed some legal issues arising under GATT Article XXIV and
RTAs, though in a limited scope. Accordingly, a new WTO jurisprudence is
emerging on RTAs. Still, the WTO cannot claim RTAs are now strictly disciplined. One clue that the discipline remains weak is the agreement among
the WTO members in November 2001 to try again to improve the rules

4. The EC, of course, has untiring enthusiasm for RTAs. The EC has some form of RTA
relationships with almost all members of the WTO. In fact, there are only few countries, including Australia, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and the United States, with which the
EC trades on most-favored-nation basis. The EC now negotiating RTAs with Mercosur, Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE), and Chile. See
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/euta.htm (listing the complete list of EC regional
trade agreements).
5. JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 43 (1950).

6. Gardner Patterson, Implicationsfor the GATT and the World Trading System, in FREE
TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 361 (Jeffrey Schott ed., 1989).
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governing RTAs through the Doha Round. 7 It is important that the members
"get it right" and take RTA-related issues even more seriously than in the
Uruguay Round.
This paper offers a comprehensive review of RTAs and GATT Article
XXIV. The paper argues that a new WTO jurisprudence on RTAs is
emerging. It is hoped that the new WTO dispute settlement and the resulting WTO jurisprudence would prevent any blatant abuse of RTAs for protectionist purposes. But, it is still questionable whether the WTO dispute
settlement system is sufficient to discipline RTAs.
Section II of the paper briefly looks at the historical background of the
Article. Section III reviews forms of RTAs permitted by the GATT/WTO
regime. Section IV examines the criteria for the formation of a
GATT/WTO-consistent RTA. Section V examines special criteria for RTAs
among developing countries. Section VI explores the disciplining of RTAs
under the GATT/WTO process. Section VII addresses the question of
whether Article XXIV as operating under the WTO system is effective in
disciplining RTAs. Section VIII offers concluding remarks.
II.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GATT ARTICLE XXIV

The interwar (1920-1940) experience strongly influenced the negotiations that led to the 1947 GATT.8 Many policy makers saw restrictive trade
policies in general, bilateralism in particular, as contributing to the economic depression of the 1930s and the outbreak of the war. 9 These perceptions fostered a strong will to create a postwar international economic order
based on a liberal non-discriminatory trading system.10 Thus, the United
States strongly advocated for the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) principle
and stressed that GATT must prevent discriminatory and preferential treatment. "1

While the GATT negotiators appreciated the virtues of the MFN principle, they could not commit seriously to it in a universal, nondiscriminatory way. British Imperial Preferences were a stumbling block.

7. Ministerial Declaration: Adopted on 14 November 2001,
WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(0I)/DEC/1,
para.
29
(Nov.
20,
2001),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist-e/min0 le/mindecle.htm.
8. RICHARD POMFRET, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS 71

(1997). These negotiations were intended to lead to an International Trade Organization (ITO),
playing the role of the key multilateral trade body. Id.; see also RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 127-32 (2d ed. 2001) (reviewing the ITO's failure and the
origins of GATT).
9. POMFRET, supra note 8, at 71.
10. Id.
11. JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 576-77 (1969).
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The American side saw easier access to the British, Canadian, and other
Commonwealth markets as an important counterweight to protectionist lobbies in selling a more liberal trade policy to domestic constituencies. 12 The
British side feared protectionist trends in the United States, especially if the
Republicans were to win the 1948 election, and the United Kingdom was
unwilling to take any initiative in modifying tariff preferences before the
level of American tariffs was negotiated down.13 Also, there was a political
motive behind Britain's defense of Imperial Preferences. 14 The war effort
had strengthened pro-Commonwealth public sentiment, and tariff preferences provided a means of maintaining ties during the post-war era of
growing political independence of Commonwealth members. 15 As a compromise, paragraph 2 of Article I of GATT "grandfathered" from the MFN
requirement of preferential arrangements in force at the time the GATT entered into force.16 These arrangements included the existing British Imperial
Preferences, preferences in force in the French Union, preferences given by
the Benelux countries and by the United States, preferences exchanged
between Chile and its neighbors, and preferences granted by the LebanoSyrian Customs Union to Palestine and Transjordan. 17
Though the United States sought to dismantle trading preferences, it
recognized the legitimacy of an exception for customs unions (CUs) for a
number of reasons.1 8 The American negotiators accepted the possibility of
an economic case for CUs. An often-quoted summary of the American justification for advancing the CU exception to the MFN principle is as follows:
A custom union creates a wider trading area, removes obstacles to
competition, makes possible a more economic allocation of resources, and thus operates to increase production, and raise planes
of living. A preferential system, on the other hand, retains internal
barriers, obstructs economy in production, and restrains the growth
of income and demand. .. . A custom union is conducive to the

expansion of trade on a basis of multilateralism and nondiscrimination; a preferential system is not.1 9

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

POMFRET, supra note 8, at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
POMFRET, supra note 8, at 73.

17. See Annexes to GATT Article I, reprinted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
HANDBOOK 250-54 (2d ed. 2001) (listing preferences).
18. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 576-77.
19. CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER OF WORLD TRADE 70-71 (1949).
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To put in Viner's terms, the American negotiators considered CUs as
having trade creating and free trade areas as having trade diverting effects.20
More importantly, after the Second World War, the unification of
2
Western Europe became a central foreign policy goal of the United States. 1
As a result, banning CUs became inconceivable because they were regarded as a vehicle for European integration. Provisions for CUs, therefore,
were included in Article XXIV of GATT.22
The American proposals, however, did not mention FTAs, nor did they
provide for interim agreements leading to CUs or FTAs.23 The negotiating
parties recognized the practical need for interim agreements because participants in CUs could not be expected to move overnight to mutual free
trade and common trade policies. 24 Thus, provisions for interim agreements
were accepted during preparatory negotiations on GATT and reflected in
Article XXIV of the original General Agreement signed on October 30,
1947.25
The drafting of the International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter
continued during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held in Havana from November 1947 to March 1948. At the end of
the Conference, a first session of the GATT contracting parties was held. In
this session, the contracting parties recognized the concept of an FTA in
which members would remove their mutual trade barriers but maintain their
individual national trade policies toward nonmembers. 26 France and developing countries supported the formal proposal that Lebanon and Syria made
regarding FTAs. The developing countries deemed the FTA technique better suited to the needs of integration among them. Indeed, they insisted on
this technique so as to avoid the CU requirement of a common external
policy. The developing countries considered the harmonization of trade
policies as required for CUs too burdensome. The United States took the
view that the technical difficulties of FTAs soon would push their members

20. VINER, supra note 5, at 43.
21. Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation, Geneva Switzerland (July 2,
1947), in I FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1947, 960 (1976) [hereinafter Minutes];
see also ALFRED TOVIAS, TARIFF PREFERENCES INMEDITERRANEAN DIPLOMACY 15-26 (1977).
22. Minutes, supra note 21, at 960; see alsoTOVIAS, supra note 21, at 15-26; Youri Devuyst,
GA7T Customs Unions Provisions and the Uruguay Round: The European Community Experience, 26 J. WORLD TRADE L. 15, 19 (1992).
23. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE REGIONALISM AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM

8 (1995)
24.
25.
26.

[hereinafter WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION].
Id.
Id.
Id.
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into establishing full CUs.27 Accordingly, provisions for FTAs were incorporated into Article XXIV of GATT in 1948.28
III. TYPES OF RTAs PERMITTED BY THE GATT/WTO REGIME
Article XXIV of GATT embodies the perception that genuine CUs and
FTAs are congruent with the MFN principle and that RTAs ought to be
building blocks toward multilateralism. 29 Despite concerns of protectionism, the negotiators of the 1947 GATT ultimately recognized that RTAs
could bring benefits to the global trading system 30and acquiesced to the reality that the desire of member governments to enter into such agreements
could not be resisted completely. 3 1 Accordingly, the WTO Panel in TurkeyRestrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products asserted that "as a
means of increasing freedom of trade, Article XXIV recognizes that, subject
to certain conditions, RTAs between the WTO Members are desirable." 32
In Article XXIV itself there are a number of indications of the broad
desirability of RTAs as a means to increase freedom of trade. For example,
paragraph 4 of Article XXIV states that "the contracting parties recognize
the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through
voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the
countries parties to such agreements." 33 As another example, Article XXIV:
(5) expressly provides for different forms of RTAs as follows: "Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a
free trade or the adoption of an interim agreement for the formulation of a
customs union or of a free- trade area." 34
The varied forms of RTAs are categorized by the extent of economic
integration undertaken by participating countries. 35 Besides the three types

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Report of the Panel, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS34/R, para. 2.2 (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile]; see also T.N. Srinivasan, Regionalism and the WTO: Is Nondiscrimination
Passj?, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 329, 330 (Anne 0. Krueger ed.
1998).
30. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile, paras. 2.25-2.26.
31. Robert E. Hudec & James D. Southwick, Regionalism and WTO Rules: Problems in the
Fine Art of DiscriminatingFairly,in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL

AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 47, 48 (Miguel R. Mendoza et al. eds., 1999).
32. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile, para. 9.98.
33. GATT Article XXIV: 4, supra note 17.
34. GATT Article XXIV: 5, supra note 17.
35. RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATr-WTO SYSTEM,
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 161 (1998).
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of RTAs mentioned in GATT Article XXIV-CUs, FTAs, and interim
agreements-RTAs could take the form of common markets and economic
unions. 36 A common market not only eliminates all barriers to trade in
goods among the members and adopts a common external tariff, but also
permits the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital within the
market. 37 An economic union includes all the features of a common market
plus a common monetary and fiscal policy and a common currency for its
members. 38
A.

CUSTOMS UNIONS

A CU eliminates barriers to trade in goods between or among its member and adopts a common external tariff that all members of the CU apply
to trade from countries outside the union. 39 A CU is defined in GATT Article XXIV: 8 as the following:
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution
of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so
that
(i)duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except,
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantiallyall
the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least
with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in
such territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same
duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of
the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in
the union.40
The Andean Group 41 and the Czech Republic-Slovak Republic Customs Union 42 are examples of CUs formed after GATT took effect on January 1, 1948.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Report,

Id.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id.
GATT Article XXIV: 8(a), supra note 17 (emphasis added).
The member countries are Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
See GATT, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic Customs Union Agreement, Working Party
GATT Doc. L/7501 (July 15, 1994).
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FREE TRADE AREAS

An FTA eliminates barriers to trade in goods between or among its
members, but the members retain all of their preexisting tariffs and other
trade barriers in their trade relations with third-party countries.4 3 In other
words, they maintain autonomous foreign economic policies vis-A-vis third
countries. The definition of an FTA as provided by GATT Article XXIV: 8
is the following:
(1) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or
more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.an
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA)45 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 46 are examples of FTAs.
C.

INTERIM AGREEMENTS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF CUS OR

FTAS
Article XXIV contemplates that a CU or FTA may be set up in a definitive sense immediately after the agreement is signed. It also expressly
acknowledges the possibility of a gap between conclusion of an RTA
agreement and birth of the RTA. Thus, there could exist a so-called "interim
agreement" leading to a CU or FTA.47 Interim agreements, however, entail
the risk of creating lasting selected preferences and discrimination. Two requirements in Article XXIV try to prevent this: first, the interim agreement
must include a plan and schedule for the formation of a CU or FTA; second,
the formation should be achieved within a "reasonable length of time." 48
Though most CUs or FTAs have been, at least in part, implemented by
stages, very few have been expressly notified as interim agreements.4 9 For
example, during the time of notification to the GATT, the Israel-United

43. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 35, at 162.
44. GATT Article XXIV: 8(b), supra note 17 (emphasis added).
45. Member countries are Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom.
46. Member countries are Canada, Mexico, and the United States. See http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/home/index-e.aspx (containing information about NAFTA).
47. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 584.
48. GATT Article XXIV: 5(c), supra note 17.
49. Background Note by the WTO Secretariat on Compendium of Issues Related to Regional
Trade Agreements, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, para. 55 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
www.wto.org.
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States Free Trade Agreement was not an FTA in a strict sense of GATT
Article XXIV because liberalization was expected in a number of sectors
over ten years. But, the Agreement was not notified as an interim agreement. 50 Countries probably avoid notifying an RTA as an interim agreement
because GATT Article XXIV, particularly subsections 5(c), 7(b), and 7(c),
allows the WTO members to examine and scrutinize interim agreements
more extensively.
D.

A FREE TRADE AREA OR A CUSTOMS UNION?

Recent WTO statistics show that of the 162 RTAs in force as of January 31, 2002, 115 are FTAs and thirteen are CUs.5' As just explained, the
most distinct difference between a CU and an FTA is that in an FTA, countries are free to set their own external trade policy; whereas in a CU, the
RTA as a whole sets a common external policy.52 Thus, countries planning
to integrate their trade have to resolve the central question of whether to
choose an FTA or CU.
The biggest advantage of a CU is that, because members have a common external tariff, it facilitates deeper integration and allows the members
to have simpler internal border formalities, possibly none at all. 53 In contrast, an FTA leaves external trade policy to individual member governments and faces a problem known as trade deflection or transshipment.54
That is the problem of the redirection of imports from outside countries
through the FTA member with the lowest external tariff in order to exploit
the tariff differential. The usual solution is rules of origin-the apparently
reasonable requirement that goods qualifying for tariff-free trade should be
produced in a member country rather than just passing through that country.55
In practice, the costs of implementing rules of origin are high. They
mean that controls on goods crossing internal frontiers have to be retained
to ensure compliance and to collect customs duties that are due. One study
finds these costs to be three to five percent of free on board (f.o.b.) prices
for trade between EFTA and the European Community. 56 In addition, rules
50. See Free-Trade Area Agreement Between Israel and the Untied States, May 14, 1987,
GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) (1998).
51. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Basic Information on Regional Trade
Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/44 ( Feb. 7, 2002). Nineteen RTAs are notified under the
Enabling Clause and fifteen under General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V.
52. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile, para. 9,125.
53. THE WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOcs 75 (2000).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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of origin afford customs authorities a good deal of discretion with strong
possibilities of abuse of this discretion. 57 Moreover, rules of origin are often
complex and onerous because they must take into account tariffs on imported intermediate goods used in products manufactured within the FTA.58
Countries in an FTA retain the sovereign power to decide individually
whether, and to what level trade restrictions should be imposed on nonmembers. The level of economic and political integration required to establish an FTA is not as extensive as a CU. Thus, an FTA attracts those states
preferring a loose-knit regional structure. 59 A CU agreement, however, does
not necessarily imply an overt surrender of national sovereignty. On the
other hand, establishing identical tariff barriers against imports from nonmembers requires a commitment to common decision-making, weakening
the ability of participating countries to determine national trade policies independently. 60
In sum, among the WTO members, an FTA is more popular than a CU
despite some problems associated with FTAs. The recent trend of regional
integration also shows a preference for FTAs. For instance, the United
States has formed FTAs with Chile, Jordan, and Singapore, and it is negotiating FTAs with Australia and Latin American countries. 6'
IV. CRITERIA FOR THE FORMATION OF A GATr/WTOCONSISTENT RTA
GATT Article XXIV does not grant the WTO members the unconditional right to form RTAs. As the WTO Panel in Turkey's Restrictions on
Textile stated: "We note that, at the very beginning of Article XXIV: 5, the
use of the word "Accordingly" indicated that the conditional right to form a
regional trade agreement has to be understood." 62 The contracting parties
during the drafting of GATT 1947 were concerned about the trade diversion
consequences of RTAs and, generally, increased protectionism. 63 To minimize the possible negative effects of RTAs, the contracting parties set out

57. Id.

58. Id. For example, the NAFTA rules of origin for textiles and apparel, color televisions,
and automobiles are complex and onerous. For different types of the NAFTA's rules of origin, see
BHALA, supra note 8, at 673-84.
59. Richard Gibb, Regionalism in the World Economy, in CONTINENTAL TRADING BLOCS:
THE GROWTH OF REGIONALISM IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 25 (Richard Gibb & Eieslaw Michalak
eds., 1994).
60. Id.

61. See USTR, World Regions, available at www.ustr.gov.
62. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile, para. 9.105.
63. Id. at paras. 2.2, 9.101.
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stringent requirements in Article XXIV.64 The definitional texts of GATT
Article XXIV: 8 require that an RTA must eliminate trade barriers on "substantially all the trade" among its members. In addition, Article XXIV: 5
mandates additional requirements by stating:
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent,
as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a
free-trade area; Provided that:
(a)with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union
or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties
not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties

and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such
interim agreement, as the case may be;
(b)with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the
adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such agreement shall
not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and

other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim
agreement as the case may be; and
(c)any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b)
shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonablelength
of time.65

The language used for these requirements in Article XXIV: 5 and 8,
however, has long been criticized for its ambiguity. That ambiguity is the

64. Id. at paras. 9.101-9.105.
65. GATT Article XXIV: 5, supra note 17, at 231 (emphasis added).
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main cause for the inconclusiveness of GATT Working Party examinations
of most RTAs. 66
A.

Is THERE A "PURPOSE" TEST FOR RTAs?

GATT Article XXIV: 4 stresses that "the purpose of a customs union
or a free trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriersto the trade of other contracting parties
with such territories." 67 According to the WTO Panel in Turkey's Restrictions on Textile, the objective of trade regionalism lies in complementing
the global trading system. That is, RTAs are to increase trade, not raise barriers to trade as a shield against other GATT/WTO prohibitions.6 8
One long contentious issue is the relationship between paragraph 4 and
the requirements and conditions for RTAs set forth in paragraphs 5 and 8 of
Article XXIV. One approach, based on the inspirational and non-mandatory
language, is that paragraph 4 is precatory in nature. 69 The "hard" rules are
in the subsequent paragraphs. 70 The opposite perspective is that paragraph 4
is a chapeau for the subsequent paragraphs and embodies general rules,
particularly a "purpose" test for a proposed RTA.71
Early in the 1950s, during the examination of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the EEC argued for
"interpretative independency" between paragraph 4 on the one hand and
paragraphs 5 though 9 on the other hand of Article XXIV. That is to say,
that the EEC maintained the fulfillment of paragraphs 5 through 9 would
"automatically and necessarily" satisfy the requirements of paragraph 4.72
Most contracting parties, however, objected to the EEC's argument. 73 Arguably, the WTO Appellate Body now has put an end to this long-standing

66. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 23, at 3-4.
67. GATT Article XXIV: 4, supra note 17, at 231 (emphasis added).
68. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile, at para. 9.163.
69. The language in Article XXIV: 4 is in both instances "should be" and not "is" to facilitate trade or not to raise barriers.
70. In trade policy usage, hard law means international arrangements that entail legally enforceable rights and obligations on their members. On the other hand, soft law means international arrangements that do not require parties to enforce the measures contained in them. In other
words, they are hortatory arrangements. WALTER GOODE, DICTIONARY OF TRADE POLICY
TERMS 131, 255 (2nd ed. 1998); see also Daniel Thurer, Soft Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 452 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., vol. IV, 2000) (discussing in detail hard law
versus soft law).
71. See Raj Bhala, The Forgotten Mercy GATT Article XXIV: 11 and Trade on the Subcontinent, Part III, NEW ZEALAND L. REV. (2002).
72. See The European Economic Community, Nov. 29, 1957, GATT B.I.S.D (6th Supp.) at
70-71 (1958).
73. See id.
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interpretative debate. In the case of Turkey's Restriction on Textile, the Appellate Body stated:
According to paragraph 4, the purpose of a customs union [RTAs]
is "to facilitate trade" between the constituent members and "not to
raise barriers to trade" with third countries. A customs union
should facilitate trade within the customs union, but it should not
do so in a way that raises barriers to trade with third countries....
Paragraph 4 contains purposive, not operative, language. It does
not set forth a separate obligation itself but, rather, sets forth the
overriding and pervasive purpose for Article XXIV, which is
manifested in operative language in the specific obligations that
are found elsewhere in Article XXIV. Thus, the purpose set forth
in paragraph 4 informs the other relevant paragraphs of Article
XXIV, including the chapeau of paragraph 5. For this reason, the
chapeau of paragraph 5, and the conditions set forth therein for
establishing the availability of a defense under Article XXIV, must
be interpreted in the light of the purpose of customs unions set
forth in paragraph 4.74
In other words, there is no separate "purpose" test for the establishment
of an RTA. At the same time, it is understood the purpose is to further trade
among members and avoid dampening trade with nonmembers.
B.

SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR RTAs UNDER ARTICLE XXIV

OF GATT
1.

The "SubstantiallyAll" Requirement

GATT Article XXIV requires a CU or FTA to eliminate trade barriers
on "substantially all" the trade among its members.75 In addition, the definition of a CU requires each member of the union to apply "substantially
the same duties and other regulations of commerce" to trade with nonmembers. 76 In fact, the term "substantially all" is used four times in the relevant
provision of GATT Article XXIV, namely, paragraph 8.77
Exactly what percentage of trade constitutes a "substantial" amount has
never been defined in bright-line terms. GATT preparatory work is not

74. Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 57 (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restriction on Textile].
75. GATT Article XXIV: 8, supra note 17, at 231.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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helpful in trying to fill in the meaning of "substantial," so some duties and
restrictions can remain in each of the cases to which the term applies.78
GATT contracting parties never reached any consensus on the interpretation
of "substantial". The WTO Secretariat acknowledged that "differences of
opinion among participants in working parties regarding the interpretation
of the 'substantially-all-trade' requirement in Article XXIV have been a
major reason why working parties have not reached a consensus on the
GATT consistency of individual agreements." 79
Discussions in GATT Working Parties have centered on whether the
concept of 'substantial' should be understood in qualitative terms (no exclusion of major sectors) or in quantitative terms (percentage of trade of the
members covered)." 80 When the consistency of the EEC with GATT was
under examination, the EEC members took a quantitative approach and
suggested that eighty percent of total trade should qualify as "substantially
all" trade. 8 1 This proposed definition was met with differing opinions. Some
contracting parties suggested the percentage of trade required to qualify as
substantial should be determined on a case-by-case basis because each RTA
differs according to the nature of the trade or the level of development. 82
This pure quantitative approach, however, was rejected in GATT's examination of the Stockholm Convention, which established the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA).83 The Convention expressly excluded trade in agriculture products, which was a major sector in the EFTA countries. The
EFTA countries observed that the phrase used in Article XXIV was "substantially all the trade," not "trade in substantially all the products." Thus,
they argued, the exclusion of a certain sector of goods should not preclude
conformance with Article XXIV.84 Again, GATT Working Parties could
not make any conclusive decision on this issue. However, they agreed that
no important segment of trade can be omitted from an agreement if that
agreement is to meet "substantially all the trade" requirement. 85 The 1960
GATT Report states:

78. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 608.
79. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 23, at 13.
80. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE, VOL. 2, 824-27 (1995) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL INDEX]; WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, supra note 23, at 13.

81. The European Economic Community, Nov. 29, 1957, GATI B.I.S.D. (6th Supp.) at 99
(1957).

82. See id. at 100.
83. See European Free Trade Association: Examination of Stockholm Convention, June 4,
1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 70 (1960).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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It was also contended that the phrase "substantially all the trade"
had a qualitative as well as quantitative aspect and that it should
not be taken as allowing the exclusion of a major sector of economic activity. For this reason, the percentage of trade covered,
even if it were established to be 90 percent, was not considered to
be the only factor to be taken into account. The member States
agreed that the quantitative aspect, in other words the percentage
of trade freed, was not the only consideration to be taken into account. 86
Despite such interpretative problems, the Uruguay Round negotiators
essentially made no progress on this issue. 87 The only reference to the
"substantially all trade" issue was in the Preamble to the Uruguay Round
Understanding on Article XXIV.88 Paragraph 4 of the Preamble simply

states the obvious: "Such contribution [to the expansion of world trade] is
increased if the elimination between the constituent territories of duties and
other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded." 89
In the Turkey's Restriction on Textile9O case, the Appellate Body made

two contributions to resolve the problem of defining "substantially all." The
Appellate Body clarified that the term "substantially" in paragraph 8(a) of
Article XXIV has both qualitative and quantitative components. 9' The Appellate Body affirmed the following observation of the Panel in the case:
[t]he ordinary meaning of the term "substantially" in the context of
sub-paragraph 8(a) appears to provide for both qualitative and
quantitative components. The expression "substantially the same
duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of
the Members of the [customs] union" would appear to encompass
both quantitativeand qualitative elements, the quantitative aspect
more emphasized in relation to duties. 92
In addition, with respect to the requirement for a CU to have "substantially the same" trade regulations in trade with nonmembers under subpara-

86. Id.; ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 80, at 825.
87. Hudec & Southwick, supra note 31, at 61.
88. Understandingon the Interpretationof Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, reprinted in BHALA, supra note 17, at 296-99 [hereinafter Uruguay Round Understandingon Article XXIV].
89. Id. at 296
90. See supra notes 154-180 and accompanying text (analyzing the case in detail).
91. Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restriction on Textile, paras. 49-50.
92. Panel Report on Turkey's Restriction on Textile, para. 9.148; Appellate Body Report on
Turkey's Restriction on Textile, para. 49 (emphasis added).
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graph 8(a)(ii), the Appellate Body stated that comparable trade regulations
having similar effects do not meet this standard.93 Here, the Appellate Body
disagreed with the Panel's observation that "as a general rule, a situation
where constituent members have 'comparable' trade regulations having
similar effects with respect to the trade with third countries, would generally meet the qualitative dimension of the requirements of sub-paragraph
8(a)(ii)." 94 Disapproving of the Panel's holding, the Appellate Body stated:
"Sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) requires the constituent members of a customs
union to adopt "substantially the same" trade regulations. In our view,
"comparable trade regulations having similar effects" do not meet this standard. A higher degree of "sameness" is requited by the terms of subparagraph 8(a)(ii)." 95 In brief, the Appellate Body felt that the Panel had set
too low a threshold for sameness.
2.

The "Not On The Whole HigherOr More Restrictive"
Requirement

Paragraph 5 of Article XXIV basically states that RTAs shall not become more restrictive than prior to their formation and should not adversely
affect the interests of the nonmembers. Paragraph 5 provides for an assessment of the conditions of third countries' access to the markets of the parties to an RTA before and after the formation of the relevant RTA. The basis for such an assessment in the case of CUs is found in subparagraph (a)
and in the case of FTAs, in subparagraph (b).96
In the case of a CU, Article XXIV: 5(a) requires that duties and regulations in respect to trade with nonmembers shall at the beginning of an arrangement "not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general
incidence" prior to the formation of the arrangement. 97 Before the Uruguay
Round, Working Parties reviewing CUs encountered several problems regarding the criteria under paragraph 5(a). First, should the calculation of
duties be based on the "bound" or "applied" tariff rates-the maximum
rates that the CU members were allowed to apply to other GATT contracting parties or the lower rates they actually applied in some cases? Second,
should the calculation involve an arithmetical or a trade-weighted average

93. Panel Report on Turkey's Restriction on Textile, para. 9.148
94. Id. at para. 9.151.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Note by the WTO Secretariat on Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Synopsis of
"Systemic" Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/ REG/W/37, para. 40
(March 2, 2000).
97. GATT Article XXIV: 5(a), supra note 17, at 231.
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of duties? 98 Third, should "the general incidence of duties" be examined on
a product-by-product basis? In other words, should the general incidence of
duties for each product category after implementation of the CU be no
higher than the incidence of duties applied by each of the CU parties to that
product category before the agreement, or should an increase in one sector
(for example, agriculture) be offset by a decrease in another sector? 99
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV addresses these
questions as follows:
The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the general incidence of the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of a customs union shall in
respect of duties and charges be based upon an overall assessment
of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties collected.
This assessment shall be based on import statistics for a previous
representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a
tariff-line basis and in values and quantities, broken down by
WTO country of origin. The Secretariat shall compute the
weighted average tariff rates and customs duties collected in accordance with the methodology used in the assessment of tariff offers in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. For
this purpose, the duties and charges to be taken into consideration
shall be the applied rates of duty. It is recognized that for the purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations
of commerce for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual measures, regulations, products
covered and trade flows affected may be required. 100
In other words, for tariffs imposed on the trade of third parties, the Understanding states that the comparison of the level of protection is to be
based on an overall assessment of the weighted average of the applied tariffs and of the customs duties collected prior to and at the institution of the
CU or the interim agreement leading to the CU. For this purpose, the CU is
to supply import statistics for a previous representative period. The WTO

98. Trade-weighted average tariffs is a method of calculating the average impact of a tariff
regime through weighting tariffs according to the amount of trade in a given tariff line. Items
traded in high volumes therefore have a greater impact on the calculation of the average tariff than
items less or rarely traded. The major problem with this analytical approach is that high tariffs
discourage trade in the first place, and an average tariff calculated in this was is always likely to
understate the actual level of tariff protection. Nevertheless, its general usefulness as an indicator
of the overall incidence of tariff rates is not doubted. GOODE, supra note 70, at 285.
99. See Hudec & Southwick, supra note 31, at 53.
100. URUGUAY ROUND UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE XXIV, supra note 88, 2.
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Secretariat is responsible for computing the weighted average tariff rates
and customs duties collected. With respect to the "other regulations of
commerce" aspect of the exercise, the Understanding does not provide a
clear answer. The Understandingrecognizes the difficulty, but it only provides that "the examination of individual measures, regulations, products
covered and trade flows affected may be required."
Regarding Article XXIV: 5(a), the Panel and the Appellate Body in
The Turkey 's Restrictionson Textile observed two important points. First,
the Panel and the Appellate Body strongly emphasized "that the effects of
the resulting trade measures and policies of the new regional agreement
shall not be more trade restrictive, overall, than were the constituent countries' previous trade policies."10 1 Both the Panel and the Appellate Body articulated that paragraph 5(a) and the Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV provides for "an 'economic' test for assessing whether a specific
customs union is compatible with Article XXIV."102 However, the Panel
and the Appellate Body did not provide a complete answer-how the economic test would be carried out and whether the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements or the WTO adjudicative bodies themselves
would conduct such test. Second, regarding the scope of "other regulations
of commerce," the Panel stated:
The ordinary meaning of the terms "other regulations of commerce" could be understood to include any regulation having an
impact on trade (such as measures in the fields covered by WTO
rules, e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary, customs valuation, antidumping, technical barriers to trade; as well as any other traderelated domestic regulation, e.g. environmental standards, export
credit schemes). Given the dynamic nature of regional trade
agreements, we consider that this is an evolving concept. 103
Finally, with respect to an FTA, paragraph 5(b) of Article XXIV specifies that "the duties and other regulations of commerce" applied by each
country to trade with the WTO members not party to the FTA "shall not be
higher or more restrictive" after the implementation of the FTA than before.
The difference in the rule for an FTA and a CU was created for practical
reasons. In the case of a CU, parties need to have a common regime of duties and other regulations of commerce applicable to third parties. The har-

101. See Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, at para. 9.121; Appellate Body
Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, at para. 55.
102. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, at para. 9.120; Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, at para. 55.
103. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, at para. 9.120.
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monization of their tariff schedules will mean that the rates for each mem04
ber of the CU will go up for some products and down for other products.1
Article XXIV: 5(a) indicates that the common regime resulting from this
harmonization may not "on the whole" impose higher duties or more restrictive regulations of commerce on third countries.105 In contrast, because
formation of an FTA does not involve creating a common external regime
for the members to apply to third countries, there is no process of adjusting
each party's external regime upward and downward to reach a common target. Instead, each party to the FTA keeps in place its own regime for trade
with third countries, and under paragraph 5(b), the duties and other regulations of commerce in each of those individual regimes may not be higher or
more restrictive after the agreement than before.106
3.

Reasonable Length Of Time for Interim Agreements

Technically, the "substantially all" rule applies to CUs and FTAs only,
and does not apply to interim agreements. 107 GATT Article XXIV: 5, which
deals with interim agreements, does not contain this phraseology. 08 The
interim agreements must, however, meet the requirement of Article XXIV:
5 set as to the level of restriction of trade barriers permitted at the "institution" or "formation." of the CU or FTA109 Thus, an interim agreement
leading to a CU is required to have duties "not on the whole... higher...
than the general incidence" prior to formation; an FTA requires "corresponding duties to be no higher than before."110
To ensure that interim agreements leading to the formation of RTAs
are not used to disguise GATT-inconsistent preferential trade agreements,
Article XXIV: 5(c) states: "[A]ny interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of
such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length
of time.""'1 The word "reasonable," however, has caused much confusion in
the interpretation of this requirement. For decades, there was no agreement
on just how much time was reasonable. Not surprisingly, the result was the
adoption of interim agreements with almost any length of transition period.
For instance, the Greece-EEC Associations Agreement provided for an in-

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Hudec & Southwick, supra note 31, at 50.
Id.
Id.
JACKSON, supra note 11, at 584.
Id.
Id.at 585.
Id.
Id.at 584.
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terim period of twenty-two years before final formation of that CU.112
This problem was directly addressed during the Uruguay Round negotiations, where it was decided that ten years was a "reasonable length of
time." 113 Only in exceptional cases would the length of time be allowed to
exceed one decade. 1 4 In this case, members would be required to provide a
full explanation before the Council for Trade in Goods.)15
4. ProceduralRequirements For RTAs Under Article XXIV Of
GATT
a.

Notification Of The Formation And Submission Of
Relevant Information Of RTAs

All RTAs concluded by the WTO members require notification. GATT
Article XXIV: 7(a) states:
Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or
free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of
such a union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING
PARTIES and shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make
such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they
16
may deem appropriate. 1
In the case of an interim agreement, a plan and schedule should be provided when notifying the WTO members, 1 7 and any substantial changes in
the plans or schedules of these interim agreements must also be communicated to the WTO members.1 1 8 In addition, the Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV provides the following:
Customs unions and constituents of free-trade areas shall report
periodically to the Council for Trade in Goods, as envisaged by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 in their instruction to
the GATT 1947 Council concerning reports on regional agreements (BISD 18S/38) ....

on the operation of the relevant agree-

112. Association of Greece with the European Economic Community, Nov. 15, 1962, GATT
B.I.S.D (I lth Supp.) at 149-50 (1963).
113. UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE XXIV, supra note 100, at T 3.
114. Id.

115. Id. The Council for Trade in Goods is responsible for the workings of the WTO agreements dealings with goods. The Council consists of all WTO members. The Council reports to the
General Council, which acts on behalf of the Ministerial Conference on all WTO affairs.
116. GATT Article XXIV: 7(a), supra note 17, at 231.
117. GATT Article XXIV: 5(c), supra note 17, at 231.
118. GATT Article XXIV: 7(c), supra note 17, at 231.
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ment. Any significant changes and/or developments in the agreements should be reported as they occur.'1 19
These procedural requirements are intended to ensure the transparency
of the proposed agreements to other WTO members and provide any necessary information for the examination of the agreements under Article XXIV
by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.
Members of RTAs, however, have not always complied with the transparency requirements of Article XXIV. Since Article XXIV: 7(a) does not
precisely state the timing of notification and content of information, 20 some
members have taken advantage of the flexibility and delayed notification
process or provided inadequate information. Such delayed notification and
insufficient information hindered the effectiveness of the examination process of RTAs. Moreover, a large number of RTAs in force today have not
yet been notified to the WTO.121
b.

Negotiation With Third Parties Affected By A New Tariff
Arrangement

Article XXIV: 6 provides that in cases where, in the context of the
formation of a CU, a member proposes to increase any bound rate, the procedures for modification of schedules set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. 122 Article XXIV: 6 states:
If, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5(a), a contracting party proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with
the provisions of Article II, the procedure set forth in Article
XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory adjustment,
due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded
by the reduction brought about in the corresponding duty of the
other constituents of the union. 123
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV reaffirms that
these procedures must be commenced before tariff concessions are modified or withdrawn upon the formation of a CU or an interim agreement
leading to a CU.124 It also clarifies that affected members shall take due ac-

119. UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE XXIV, supra note 100, T111.
120. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Standard Format on Regional Trade
Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/6 (Aug. 15, 1996).
121. Background Note by the WTO Secretariat, Compendium of Issues Related to Regional
Trade Agreements, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/8/Rev.l, at para. 3 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
www.wto.org.
122. GATT Article XXIV: 6, supra note 17, at 231.
123. Id.
124. UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE XXIV, supra note 100, at 1 4.
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count of reductions of duties on the same tariff line made by other parties of
the CU.125 If such reductions do not provide the necessary compensatory
adjustment, members that have negotiating rights shall take "into consideration" other offers made by the CU (e.g. reductions of duties on other tariff lines). 126 Where agreement cannot be reached within a reasonable period, the CU shall be free to modify or withdraw the concession and
affected members shall then be free to retaliate. 127 Finally, the Understanding indicates that third parties are not obliged to pay "reverse compensation" to a CU for reduction of bound duties brought by the formation of
the union. 128
V.

SPECIAL CRITERIA FOR RTAs AMONG DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

Article XXIV is not the only GATT rule that permits discrimination in
the form of RTAs. Part IV of GATT on Trade and Development129 and the
1979 Enabling Clause130 allow a departure from the MFN treatment where
it benefits developing countries. Part IV of GATT establishes the principle
of nonreciprocity in trade negotiations between developed and developing
countries. 13 1
The Enabling Clause, agreed to during the Tokyo Round, provides
more lenient criteria for the formation of RTAs among developing countries. The Enabling Clause states:
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the General
Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.at 5 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5 6.
GATT on Trade and Development, Part IV, reprinted in BHALA, supra note 17, at 244-

250.
130. Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, reprinted in BHALA, supra note 17, at 257-59. The 1979
Enabling Clause was incorporated into GATT 1994.
WTO AGREEMENT, GENERAL
INTERPRETATIVE NOTE, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144, para. 1-b-iv. The WTO reaffirmed their commitment to the 1979 Enabling Clause during the Uruguay Round negotiations. WTO, MINISTERIAL
DECISIONS AND DECLARATIONS, DECISION ON MEASURES IN FAVOR OF LEAST-DEVELOPED

COUNTRIES, 33 I.L.M. 136, 138.
131. See Final Act of the Second Special Session of the Contracting Parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Feb. 8, 1965, GATT B.I.S.D. (13th Supp.) at 1-11 (1965); see also GATT Article XXXVIXXXVIII, supra note 17, at 231. Article XXXVI (8) states, "The developed contracting parties do
not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove
tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties." GATT Article
XXXVI(8), supra note 17, at 231.
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favorable treatment to developing countries, without according
such treatment to other contracting parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph I apply to the following:
(c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst lessdeveloped contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or conditions which
may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the
mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, on prod-

ucts imported from one another;
3. Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under
this clause:
(a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriersto or create undue diffi-

culties for the trade of any other contracting parties;
(b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimina-

tion of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a most-favourednation basis;
132

In other words, under the Enabling Clause, RTAs among the developing countries need to comply with the following conditions: First, similar to
paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, paragraph 3 of the Enabling Clause requires
that (1) RTAs among the developing countries shall be designed to facilitate
trade between the parties and not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for their trade with other members, and (2) such RTAs shall not impede the liberalization of trade between the parties at the multinational
level. Second, unlike Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause drops the conditions on the coverage of trade and allows developing countries to reduce
tariffs on mutual trade in any way they wish, and it allows developing
countries to reduce tariffs on non-tariff measures "in accordance with criteria which may be prescribed" by the WTO members. 33 However, to date,

132. Enabling Clause, reprinted in BAHLA, supra note 17, at 257-59 (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Enabling Clause].
133. Id. at para. 2; The Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement was notified to GATT under the 1979 Enabling Clause; see also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra
note 23, at 88-89 (listing agreements notified under the 1979 Enabling Clause).
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no such criteria or conditions have ever been prescribed. Third, like RTAs
under GATT Article XXIV, notification of the introduction, modification,
and withdrawal of such RTAs among developing countries is also required
for transparency purposes. 134
The interpretation of the Enabling Clause has given rise to controversy
among the WTO members. In particular, the WTO Secretariat notes that
"the Enabling Clause does not contain references to Article XXIV, an
omission which has left unclear whether the Enabling Clause applies in
situations where that Article does not, or affects the terms of the application
of that Article, or represents, for developing countries, a complete alternative to the Article."1 35 The Uruguay Round Understandingon Article XXIV
also does not mention the Enabling Clause and thus does not contribute to
clarifying the issues at stake. 136
VI. THE DISCIPLINING OF RTAs UNDER THE GATTI/WTO
PROCESS
A.

DIPLOMATIC DISCIPLINING OF RTAS: THE GATT WORKING
PARTIES AND THE WTO COMMITrEE ON REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS

Under Article XXIV: 7, parties to a RTA must notify and submit the
plan and all necessary information for the formation of a RTA to the contracting parties for examination.1 37 In practice, notification generally is followed by the establishment of a working party with the terms of reference
"to examine in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, [name of the
agreement], and to report to the Council... (the governing body of the
contracting parties)." 38 The Council then adopts the report, upon which the
contracting parties make recommendations according to Article XXIV: 7.139
Unfortunately, history has proven this to be one of most unsatisfactory
of all GATT procedures. For example, the GATT Working Party failed
completely with respect to the examination of the Treaty of Rome establishing EEC. The Working Party and the EEC signatories could not reach
an agreement on the legality of the EEC under Article XXIV. The final
words on the compatibility of the Treaty of Rome with GATT 1947 were

134. Enabling Clause, supra note 132, at para. 4;
135. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 23, at 18.

136. Id.
137. Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id.
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that due to insufficient information at the time, it was not possible to pursue
the examination. 140
In addition, GATT contracting parties were reluctant to de-legalize the
EEC. They feared that a direct confrontation would seriously wound the
GATT itself because the EEC included six important founding members.
This inclusive outcome established a problematic precedent for Article
XXIV analysis in later years. Consequently, "of the [eighty] working parties that have examined the conformity of [regional] agreements, only one
has ever found an agreement to be fully in conformity."' 4 1 "On the other
2
hand, no regional agreement has been found not to be in conformity."14
This record does not stand to reason; it simply cannot be the case that every
provision of every RTA in force is in full compliance with the GATT/WTO
obligations.
To improve the examination process, the WTO's General Council established the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) in 1996 to
replace the GATT Working Party review process.143 The CRTA is granted
the following terms of reference:
(a)to carry out the examination of agreements [RTAs] in accordance with the procedures and terms of reference adopted by the
Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services or
the Committee on Trade and Development, as the case may be,
and thereafter present its report to the relevant body for appropriate action;
(b)to consider how the required reporting on the operation of such
agreements should be carried out and make appropriate recommendations to the relevant body;
(c)to develop, as appropriate, procedures to facilitate and improve
the examination process;
(d)to consider the systemic implications of such agreements and
regional initiatives for the multilateral trading system and the rela-

140 Custom Unions and Free-Trade Areas: Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Feb. 1959 GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 69, 71 (1959).
141. Gary P. Sampson, Compatibility of Regional and Multilateral Trading Agreements:
Reforming the WTO Process, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 88, 90 (1996). The contracting parties concluded that the 1994 CU between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic was in conformity
with GATT Article XXIV. See GATT, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic Customs Union Agreement, Working Party Report, GATT Doc. L/7501 (July 15, 1994).
142. Sampson, supra note 141, at 90.
143. General Council, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Feb. 6, 1996, WTO Doc.
WT/L/127 (Feb. 6, 1996).
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tionship between them, and make appropriate recommendations to
the General Council; and
(e)to carry out any additional functions assigned to it by the General Council. 144
The CRTA examines RTAs that concern both trade in goods and trade
in services, and it also coordinates its functions with other committees
within the WTO, especially the Committee on Trade and Development in
cases concerning RTAs and developing countries. 145 CUs and FTAs are required to report periodically to the CRTA, which in turn is responsible for
ensuring that RTAs are in compliance with Article XXIV.146 The CRTA reports annually to the General Council on its activities. 147
B.

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINING OF RTAs: THE

WTO JURISPRUDENCE

ON

RTAs
In the pre-Uruguay Round period, the question of judicial scrutiny of
RTAs by the GATT panel process was in doubt. Under GATT regime, adjudication by GATT panels was generally limited due to the right of the
losing party to block the adoption of a panel report. More significantly, the
issue of whether GATT panels could have jurisdiction to review the compatibility of RTAs with Article XXIV was unsettled. For example, an unadopted panel report refused to address issues related to Article XXIV on
the grounds that the "examination or re-examination of Article XXIV
agreements was the responsibility of the Contracting Parties."' 48 In fact, the
inapplicability of the GATT 1947 dispute settlement mechanism to Article
XXIV and the weak dispute settlement system suffocated any meaningful
jurisprudential development on RTAs. 149
The question of judicial scrutiny is now resolved by the Uruguay
Round Understandingon Article XXIV. In paragraph 12, the Understanding

clarifies that the WTO dispute settlement procedure can be invoked with

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. WTO, Report (1996) of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements to the General
Council, WTO Doc. WT/REG/2, (June 11, 1996).
147. Id.
148. European Community-Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain
Countries in the Mediterranean Region: Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. L/5776, Feb. 7, 1985,
unadopted, para. 4.15 (1985).
149. Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the BarrierBetween Regionalism and Multilateralism:A New
Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J. 419, 437-38 (2001).
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respect to any issue concerning Article XXIV.150 Paragraph 12 of the Uruguay Round Understandingon Article XXIV now states:
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as
elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding
may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs
unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to the formation of accustoms union or free-trade area. 151
Since the Uruguay Round, the new WTO dispute settlement system has
had the opportunity to deal with some aspects of Article XXIV in a few
cases. Below, two significant cases are discussed in detail: TurkeyRestrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products152 and Canada53
Measures Affecting Automotive Industry.1
1. Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products
a. Facts
On September 12, 1963, Turkey and the EEC signed the Ankara
Agreement to create a CU gradually.154 On March 6, 1995, the EC-Turkey
Association Council adopted Decision 1/95, which regulates the implementation of the final phase of the CU between Turkey and the EC. Article
12(2) of the Decision states that Turkey, as from the entry into force of the
Decision and in conformity with GATT Article XXIV, will apply substantially the same commercial policy in the textile sector as does the EC.155 To
implement the Decision, on January 1, 1996, Turkey introduced quantitative restrictions on imports from India on nineteen categories of textile and
clothing products. 156
The WTO Panel, established at India's request, found in its report that
the quantitative restrictions introduced by Turkey were inconsistent with the

150. UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE XXIV, supra note 100, para. 12.

151. Id.
152. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile; Appellate Body Report on Turkey's
Restriction on Textile (adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body on Nov. 19, 1999).
153. Report of the Panel, Canada-CertainMeasures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
WT/DS139/R. WT/DS142/R (adopted on June 19, 2000) [hereinafter "Panel Report on Canada-Automotive Industry"].
154. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile para. 2.10
155. Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles para. 2.
156. See Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile paras. 2.2-2.46, 4.1-4.3, app. (discussing the underlying facts and a more detailed description of the products involved in this case).
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provisions of Articles XI and XII of GATT, as well as with Article 2.4 of
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). 157
On appeal, Turkey did not question the Panel's findings regarding the
inconsistency of its measures with Articles XI and XII of GATT and Article
2 (4) of ATC. Turkey raised the substantive issue of whether the Panel erred
by denying Turkey's claim that the quantitative restrictions were justified
by GATT Article XXIV.
b. Analysis of the Appellate Body Report
At the outset, the Panel had to deal with the issue as to whether and, if
so, to what extent it had jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of a CU
with the WTO. As noted before, there was virtually no effective judicial
control of the legality of CUs or FTAs during the pre-Uruguay Round period. The Panel concluded, on the basis of the Understanding on Article
XXIV, that it had jurisdiction to examine the quantitative restrictions
adopted by Turkey on the occasion of the formation of its CU. The Panel
stated, "We cannot find anything in the DSU, Article XXIV or the 1994
GATT Understanding on Article XXIV that would suspend or condition the
right of Members to challenge measures adopted on the occasion of the
formation of a customs union."1 58
However, the Panel remained vague with respect to the extent to which
it is authorized to examine the overall compatibility of an RTA with the
WTO. The Panel seemed to express the view that independent review of the
overall WTO compatibility of a CU is a question to be dealt with by the
CRTA rather than judicial bodies, such as panels and the Appellate Body.
The Panel determined that RTAs might contain a wide range of measures,
"all of which could potentially be examined by panels, before, during, or
after the CRTA examination." 159 But, then it goes on: "However, it is arguable that a customs union (or a free trade area) as a whole would logically
not be a 'measure' as such, subject to challenge under the DSU."60
Eventually, the Panel found a way not to rule on the matter explicitly.
It held that, in recognition of the principle of judicial economy, it was not

157. Id. at para. 10.1.
158. Id. at para. 9.51. The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV on its face,
grants a large review competence to WTO adjudicating bodies. However, the reports of the Panel
and the Appellate Body in the present case seemed to indicate disagreement as to the extent of
judicial review.
159. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, para. 9.53.
160. Id.
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necessary to judicially assess the Turkey-EC CU to address India's
claims. 161
The Appellate Body subsequently clarified the issue, but explicitly
noted it was not being called upon to rule on this question. Nevertheless, the
Appellate Body made it clear that it requires a member state that invokes
Article XXIV as a defense against the incompatibility of a measure with
other WTO provisions to "demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV."162 In conclusion,
the Appellate Body approved the competence of panels to review judicially
the legality of RTAs pursuant to Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. Moreover, it did not indicate there are limits to that justiciability. 163
The Panel articulated a narrow scope of GATT Article XXIV as an exception to WTO obligations. According to the Panel, GATT Article XXIV
does not authorize the introduction of the disputed quantitative restrictions. 164 The Panel interpreted that GATT Article XXIV only provides CUs
with a basis for measures otherwise incompatible with the MFN principle in
part I of GATT.
The Appellate Body's holdings differ in two respects from the Panel:
(1) the Appellate Body expands the scope of GATT Article XXIV as a justification for GATT-inconsistent measures and (2) it tightens, however, the
requirements which an RTA must meet in order to qualify as a CU. Put differently, it loosens one rope, but tightens the other.
The Appellate Body expanded the applicability of GATT Article XXIV
as an exception to WTO obligations beyond the MFN principle. The Appellate Body's argument rested on the "chapeau" of Article XXIV (5),
which, according to the Appellate Body, the Panel failed to take adequate
account of in its legal reasoning. The Appellate Body observed the following:
First, in examining the text of the chapeau [Article XXIV: (5)] to
establish its ordinary meaning, we note that the chapeau states that
the provisions of the GATT 1994 "shall not prevent" the formation
of a customs union. We read this to mean that the provisions of
the GATT 1994 shall not make impossible the formation of a cus-

161. Id. at paras. 9.4, 9.208.
162. Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, para. 58. The Appellate
Body made reference to the India-QuantitativeRestrictions on Imports of Agriculture, Textile
and IndustrialProducts case, WT/DS90/AB/R, in which the panel had jurisdiction to review the
justification of balance-of-payment restrictions under Article XVIII.B of the GATT 1994. Id.
163. See Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, paras. 58-60.
164. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, paras. 9.154, 9.156, 9.188.
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toms union. Thus, the chapeau makes it clear that Article XXIV
may, under certain conditions, justify the adoption of a measure
which is inconsistent with certain other GAIT provisions, and may
be invoked as a possible "defense" to a finding of inconsistency. 165
Thus, the Appellate Body found the "chapeau" of Article XXIV: 5
leads to the conclusion that Article XXIV may be invoked as a general defense to WTO-inconsistent measures. The scope of the defense is not confined to only MFN-inconsistent actions. 166 Surely, the Appellate Body loosened the rope here.
The Appellate Body emphasized that a CU or FTA must comply with
all the requirements of Article XXIV.167 The Appellate Body stated that
GATT Article XXIV: 8 establishes the standards for the internal and external trade regimes that must be met to satisfy the definition of a CU.
To qualify as a CU, Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) requires duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce be eliminated with respect to "substantially all the trade" as between the constituent members. The Appellate
Body pointed out that the key term "substantially" is not identical to "all the
trade" yet more than merely "some of the trade".168 Thus, the Appellate
Body added some flexibility that was intended for parties to meet this internal aspect. However, the Appellate Body cautioned that such flexibility is
not unlimited: "We caution that the degree of "flexibility" that subparagraph 8(a)(i) allows is limited by the requirement that 'duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce' be 'eliminated with respect to substantially all' internal trade". 69
Here, the Appellate Body considerably limited the flexibility with respect to both the elimination of duties and other regulations applicable to
the internal trade between the constituent members and their common external trade regime. However, it remains open where, in a specific case, the
benchmark between all and merely some of the trade exactly will be set.
The Appellate Body seemed to indicate that for a CU to be consistent with
Article XXIV, the term "substantially all the trade" requires that a certain
percentage of trade is liberalized and no major sector of national economy
is excluded.
The Appellate Body also stated that Article XXIV: 8(a)(ii) sets the external requirement for a "common external trade regime." The commonality

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, para. 45 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at para. 58.
Id. at para. 48.
Id.
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need not be exact, but the external trade regimes must be substantially the
same. According to the Appellate Body, it must "closely approximate
'sameness,"' and the Appellate Body rejected the Panel's interpretation to
the effect that the external trade regimes of constituent states may be "comparable." Thus, the Appellate Body required a higher degree of sameness in
70
external commercial policy of CU members. 1
In addition, the Appellate Body stated that Article XXIV: 5(a) imposes
an additional external requirement that duties and other regulations of
commerce "shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the
general incidence" prior to formation of CU.171 The Appellate Body concluded that conditions for CUs must be interpreted in the light of the purpose of a CU enshrined in Article XXIV: 4.172 The Appellate Body added
that a balance must be struck between the positive internal effects of CUs
and any negative trade effects on third parties. The Appellate Body agreed
with the Panel, stating that such balance involves an economic test. 173 In
sum, the Appellate Body tightened the rope by insisting that all the requirements of a CU embodied in Article XXIV must be taken seriously.
In conclusion, the Appellate Body set forth a two-part test in invoking
GATT Article XXIV as a defense. In a case involving the formation of a
CU, the justification of a measure that is inconsistent with certain other
GATT provisions is available only when the following two conditions are
fulfilled. The Appellate Body observed the following:
Accordingly, on the basis of this analysis of the text and the context of the chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV, we are of the
view that Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions. However, in a case involving the formation of a customs union, this "defense" is available only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the party
claiming the benefit of this defense must demonstrate that the

measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs
union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs8(a)
and 5(a) of Article XXIV.

And, second, that party must demon-

strate that the formation of that customs union would be prevented
if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. Again,

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at paras. 49-50.
Id.
Id. at para. 57.
Id. at paras. 55-57.
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both these conditions must be met to have the benefit of the defense under Article XXIV.174
In fact, the Appellate Body laid down three conditions when Article
XXIV is invoked to justify a WTO-inconsistent measure. The conditions
are as follows. First, the deviation from the WTO rules must take place
upon the formation of the RTA; they cannot be adopted after the creation or
completion of the RTA. Second, the member invoking rules on RTAs to
justify its actions must prove that its RTA is in full compliance with both
paragraphs five and eight of Article XXIV. Third, the specific measure
challenged must be necessary for the formation and completion of the
RTA.175 Here again the Appellate Body tightened the rope.
Moreover, it appears the Appellate Body articulated a necessity test. It
put the burden of proof on the defending party to the effect that (i) the RTA
in dispute is a "CU" or an "FTA" as defined by Article XXIV of the GATT
1994, and (ii) the measure at issue is essential for the formation of that
agreement. As to the first requirement, the issue of whether the Turkey-EC
customs union, in the present case, met the requirements of paragraphs 5(a)
and 8(a) of Article XXIV was not appealed before the Appellate Body.176
With regard to the second requirement, Turkey argued that the EC had
in place a series of WTO compatible textile quotas,1 77 and thus, it was required to impose quotas on textile imports. Turkey contended that if it were
not allowed to impose quantitative restrictions on the textile and clothing
products at issue, the EC would exclude all imports of these products from
Turkey to prevent the EC quantitative restrictions from being circumvented.
If that were to happen, Turkey argued, forty percent of Turkey's exports
would be excluded from internal trade within the CU between Turkey and
the EC. Turkey added that this would lead to an inconsistency with Article
XXIV: 8(a)(i) because the proposed CU would not cover "substantially" all
trade. 78
The Appellate Body, however, rejected Turkey's arguments and stated
that Turkey was not necessarily required to apply the quantitative restrictions to meet the requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) of Article XXIV.
Instead, there existed less trade restrictive alternatives available to Turkey

174. Id. at para. 58 (emphasis added).
175. Gabrielle Marceau & Cornelis Reiman, When and How is a Regional Trade Agreement
Compatible with the WTO? 28 L. ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 297, 313 (2001).
176. Panel Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textile, para. 60.
177. At the time of the entry of force of the ATC, EC notified and maintained certain quantitative restrictions on textile products. Turkey, however, did not notify and maintain such restrictions.
178. Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, para. 6.85.
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and EC to prevent any possible diversion of trade while at the same time respecting the parameters of both sub-paragraphs 8(a)(i) and 8(a)(ii). The Appellate Body mentioned, inter alia, rules of origin to distinguish between
Turkish and third country textile products.179 In conclusion, the Appellate
Body confirmed that Turkey failed to satisfy its burden of proof that the
formation of the Turkey-EC customs union would have been prevented if it
were not allowed to adopt the quantitative restrictions at issue. 180
2.

Canada-MeasuresAffecting Automotive Industry.
a. Facts

This dispute concerned duty-free treatment accorded by Canada to imports of automobiles, buses, and specified commercial vehicles by certain
manufacturers. This duty-free treatment was provided under the Canadian
Customs Tariff, the Motor Vehicles Tariff Order 1998 (MVTO 1998), and
the Special Remission Orders (SROs).181
The MVTO 1998 has its origins in the Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States of America (Auto Pact). The Auto Pact was implemented domestically in Canada by legislation that included the MVTO
1965, which was replaced by the MVTO 1988 and later by the MVTO
1998. The MVTO 1998 sets out three conditions that manufacturers must
meet to be eligible for the import duty exemption. 8 2 First, the manufacturer
must have produced in Canada, during the designated base year, motor vehicles of the class imported.183 The second condition relates to certain production to sales ratio requirements.1 84 Specifically, it is required that the ratio of the net sales value of the vehicles produced in Canada to the net sales
value of all vehicles of that class sold for consumption in Canada in the period of importation must be "equal to or higher than" the ratio in the base
year, and the ratio shall not in any case be lower than 75:100.185
Finally, the third condition concerns certain Canadian value added requirements (the CVA requirements). Specifically, it required that the

179. Id. at para. 4.1.
180. Id. at para. 6.84.
181. Report of the Panel, Canada-CertainMeasures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
WT/DS139/R. WT/DS1442/R (adopted June 19, 2000) paras. 2.1-2.33, 10.1-10.8 [hereinafter
Panel Report on Canada-Automotive Industry].
182. Id. at para. 2.2.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at para. 2.3 n.3.
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amount of Canadian value added in the manufacturer's local production of
motor vehicles must be "equal to or greater than" the amount of Canadian
value added in the local production of motor vehicles of that class during
the base year.18 6 The MVTO 1998 provides that the CVA requirement for
each manufacturer is to be calculated based on the "aggregate" of certain
costs of production, including the cost of parts produced in Canada and
materials of Canadian origin that are incorporated in the motor vehicles,
transportation costs, labor costs incurred in Canada, and manufacturing
overhead expenses incurred in Canada.8 7 The base year was set as a
twelve-month period in 1963-64 for manufacturing that became eligible
immediately after implementation through the original MVTO in 1965.188
In addition to the manufacturers that were eligible for the import duty
exemption under the MVTO 1998, Canada also designated certain other
companies as eligible to receive the exemption through the SROs. The
SROs set forth, for each of these companies, specific production-to-sales
ratio requirements and CVA requirements that the manufacturer must meet
to receive the import duty exemption.1 89 Finally, as part of the Auto Pact,
certain manufacturers were asked by the Canadian government to submit
letters of undertaking, documents that are alleged by the complainants to
contain additional CVA requirements. 190
In accordance with the obligations of the Canada-United States FTA,
the list of manufacturers eligible for the import duty exemption was closed
in 1989. Therefore, since 1989, no additional SROs have been promulgated,
and no additional manufacturers have been designated as eligible for the
duty exemption under the MVTO 1998.191
Japan and EC argued that Canada's auto regime violated MFN principle. 192 Japan and EC contended that, even though Canada's duty-free treatment per se was not limited to the United States and Mexico, most of the
vehicles that received duty-free treatment originated in the United States or
Mexico. 193 Canada argued that it had formed an FTA (NAFTA) with the
United States and Mexico and, therefore, granting duty-free treatment to

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at para. 2.26.
Id. at para. 2.3.
Id. at para. 2.33-2.35.
Id. at para 2.4.
Id. at para. 2.9-2.10.
Id. at para. 6.31.
Id. at para. 5.191.

2003]

WTO JURISPRUDENCE ON RTAs

products of its free-trade partners was exempt from MFN obligation by reason of Article XXIV.194
b. Analysis of the Panel's Report
After examining Canada's measure and Article XXIV, the Panel rejected the defense under Article XXIV. The Panel observed the following:
The measure not only grants duty-free treatment in respect of
products imported from the United States and Mexico by manufacturer-beneficiaries; it also grants duty-free treatment in respect
of products imported from third countries not parties to a customs
union or free-trade area with Canada. The notion that the import
duty exemption involves the granting of duty-free treatment of imports from the United States and Mexico does not capture this aspect of the measure. In our view, Article XXIV clearly cannot
justify a measure which grants WTO-inconsistent duty-free treatment to products originating in third countries not parties to a
customs union or free trade agreement.
We further note that the import duty exemption does not provide
for duty-free importation of all like products originating in the
United States or Mexico and that whether such products benefit
from the exemption depends upon whether they are imported by
certain motor vehicle manufacturers in Canada who are eligible for
the exemption.... Thus, in practice the import duty exemption
does not apply to some products that would be entitled to duty-free
treatment if such treatment were dependant solely on the fact that
the products originated in the United States or Mexico. We thus
do not believe that the import duty exemption is properly characterized as a measure which provides for duty-free treatment of imports of products of parties to a free-trade area. 195
In sum, the Panel observed that the duty-free treatment at issue was
provided to countries other than the United States and Mexico. Therefore,
Article XXIV cannot be invoked to justify a measure that grants WTOinconsistent duty-free treatment to products originating in third countries
not parties to an FTA. The Panel further noted that the exemption did not
apply to all manufacturers from the Untied States and Mexico, only eligible
ones. Thus, the Panel concluded that this was not a measure that provided
duty-free treatment to imports of products of parties to an FTA. Accord194. Id. at para. 2.11.
195. Id. at paras. 10.55-10.56.
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ingly, the Panel found that in this case, GATT Article XXIV does not provide a justification for the inconsistency with the MFN principle.
Canada did not appeal the Panel's findings on GATT Article XXIV.196
Again, the Panel here reaffirmed that Article XXIV must be taken seriously
and the Panel is ready to examine critically any claim under Article XXIV.
VII. IS ARTICLE XXIV AS OPERATING UNDER THE WTO SYSTEM
EFFECTIVE IN DISCIPLINING RTAS?
Undoubtedly, the WTO cases discussed above have contributed in the
emergence of a new WTO jurisprudence on RTAs. The WTO adjudicating
bodies would not grant an easy shelter under GATT Article XXIV for
WTO-inconsistent measures. This is certainly a significant development.
But, it would be incorrect to say GATT Article XXIV has succeeded in exercising effective control over RTAs or disciplining them in their elaboration or function. It is doubtful whether the Article will effectively ensure
discipline of RTAs in the years to come.
A. SERIOUS INTERPRETATIVE PROBLEMS STILL EXIT
There remain serious interpretative problems associated with Article
XXIV. The WTO members still dispute the terms such as "substantially all
the trade" and "other restrictive regulations of commerce."1 97 To date, the
absence of an agreed understanding on "substantially all trade" is one of the
main reasons for the failure of the CRTA to arrive at a clear-cut decision on
the WTO-conformity of RTAs.198 A similar level of controversy surrounds
the interpretation of the requirement that the level of trade barriers be "not
on the whole higher or more restrictive."] 99 In its report on regionalism, the
WTO disappointingly noted the Uruguay Round made little progress regarding the interpretation problems of Article XXIV.200

196.
35 (2001)
197.
198.
199.
200.

See Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2000, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L COMP. L. 20,
(reviewing the Appellate Body's Report).
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 23, at 20
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B.

ARTICLE XXIV AND OTHER RTA-RELATED UNADDRESSED
ISSUES

1.

Trade in Services

GATT Article XXIV is limited by its exclusive focus on trade in
goods. Despite the fact that contemporary trade involves goods and services, the latter category lies beyond the scope of Article XXIV. Article V of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)201 features several
provisions for "economic integration." One might argue that GATS could
adopt GATT/WTO jurisprudence in interpreting Article V, given the similarities between GATS Article V and GATT Article XXIV.202 Unfortunately, the inherent differences between goods and services preclude simple
legal conflation, which in turn may complicate the establishment of techni203
cally common jurisprudence in trade regionalism.
2.

Issue of Pre-formationand Post-formation

"GATT Article XXIV concerns only the 'formation,' i.e., creation or
expansion, of RTAs. Its basic purpose is to authorize the formation of
RTAs if they comply with the requirements stipulated in paragraphs 4 to
8."204 Article XXIV does not provide any mechanism to oversee the preformation negotiating process of RTAs.205 Since Article XXIV does not
impose a strict timing of notification, countries notify RTAs when they are
finally signed and sealed, 206 or notification happens long after the RTAs
come into force. Once the RTAs are final and come into effect, it is difficult
to change the terms of the RTAs should the WTO members find inconsistencies with Article XXIV.207 In addition, Article XXIV is silent on the
post-formative "operation" of RTAs vis-A-vis other trading units and vis-avis the WTO.208

201.
202.
resemble
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 35, at 166 (summarizing GATS).
Cho, supra note 149, at 450. "For instance, Paragraphs 1 and 4 of GATS Article V
Paragraphs 4 and 8, respectively of GATr Article XXIV." Id.
Id. at 450-51.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 452.
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Rules of Origin Issue

By definition, CUs and FTAs offer tariff preferences to the importation
of goods from member countries. Rules of origin are required to determine
when goods are entitled to these preferences. Rules of origin, particularly in
FTAs, can be very complex and onerous. 209 Neither the GATT generally
nor the language of Article XXIV, however, deals with the important question of "rules of origin." Some GATT members have argued rules of origin
should be considered "regulation of commerce" for the purposes of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV. Others have strongly asserted the opposite
view. 2 10 During the Uruguay Round, the WTO members were unable to
agree on any language clarifying the treatment of rules of origin under Article XXIV or on any new substantive disciplines governing rules of origin in
RTAs.211 Instead, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin includes only transparent and procedural requirements for rules of origin in
RTAs.212 Otherwise, the Agreement deals with non-preferential rules of
origin.
C.

RTAs

DIPLOMATIC EXAMINATION PROCESS IS STILL INEFFECTIVE

First, transparency of the RTAs has been a continuous problem of the
GATT/WTO regime. The RTAs have continuous problem of four "Ws": (i)
when to notify, (ii) where to notify, (iii) what to notify, and (iv) whether to
notify. 213 The time at which an RTA should be notified is not precisely
formulated in GATT Article XXIV. Accordingly, many RTAs are notified
when their texts have already been sealed or even when the RTA is already
in force. The late notification hinders any effective examination process. In
addition, a number of RTAs currently in force have not been formally notified to the WTO, in particular, RTAs among the developing countries. In
addition, even in cases where RTAs have been notified, very often parties to
the RTA do not provide sufficient information nor do they provide explanations how they complied with GATT Article XXIV. The lack of transparency leads to an ineffective examination process. 214
209. David Palmeter, Rules of Origin in Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas, in
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 326 (Kym Anderson & Richard

Blackhurst eds. 1993).
210. See ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 80, at 802-03.
211. See MTN.GNG/NG7/W/13 (August 11, 1987, 5) (mentioning rules of origin a one of
the problems in the application of Article XXIV).
212. See Agreement on Rules of Origin, reprinted in BHALA, supra note 17, at 459-72.
213. See Chile's Submission to Negotiating Group on Rules regarding Regional Trade
Agreements, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/16 (July 10, 2002), available at www.wto.org.
214. WTO Secretariat, on Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements,
WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/Rev. 1, para. 1-4 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at www.wto.org.
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Second, the work of the CRTA has not been a resounding success. The
problem of transparency and the disagreements over the interpretations of
Article XXIV have seriously affected the examination process by the
CRTA. In its 2001 report, the CRTA stated, "The Committee has currently
under examination a total of 110 agreements ....

For twenty-three RTAs,

the Committee has not yet started the factual examination. Eighteen RTAs
are currently undergoing factual examination. The remaining sixty-nine
RTAs have already completed factual examination and the draft examination reports are in various stages of consultation and finalization." 2 15 However, as of 2003, not a single report has been adopted since the establishment of the WTO.
D. THE WTO's JURISPRUDENCE ON RTAs THOUGH EMERGING, BUT
IT IS STILL INSUFFICIENT

In the pre-Uruguay Round period, the GATT panels did not adjudicate
any issues under Article XXIV resulting in no jurisprudence on RTAs.216
After the Uruguay Round, not enough cases have been brought to interpret
Article XXIV. The WTO panels and the Appellate Body have had an opportunity to discuss Article XXIV in some occasions, in a very limited
context. For example, in the only case where the Appellate Body to a great
extent examined Article XXIV, it was reluctant to deal comprehensively
with Article XXIV. It stated that "we make no finding either on many other
issues that may arise under Article XXIV. The resolution of those other issues must await another day." 217 Thus, a mature jurisprudence of judicial
review is yet to develop.
VIII.CONCLUDING REMARKS
RTAs should not supplant multilateral trade liberalization under the
auspices of the WTO. RTAs should not be accepted as alternatives to the
WTO. Even though more than 162 RTAs are in force in the world, the
WTO is not irrelevant. Countries have concluded eight rounds of negotiations on a multilateral basis and have committed to complete the Doha
Round by 2005. Thus, the WTO is still the main engine of trade liberalization, at least viewed as such.
However, the rapid growth of RTAs raises serious concerns. The
GATT negotiators envisaged RTAs would have trade diverting effects.
215. Report (2001) of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council,
WTO Doc. WT/REG/10, para. 6-7 (Oct. 10, 2001), available at www.wto.org.
216. See Sampson, supra note 141, at 90.
217. Appellate Body Report on Turkey's Restrictions on Textiles, at para. 65.
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Thus, they put disciplines in Article XXIV. True, Article XXIV has a number of interpretative problems, but, it is not bereft of disciplines. First, trade
is to be liberalized on "substantially all trade." Second, formation of an
RTA shall not result in an increase of protection. Thus, GATT Article
XXIV per se cannot be accused of being without any substantive contents.
What, then, is the fundamental problem? It is compliance with the disciplines that do exist in GATT Article XXIV. This compliance problem exits because the disciplines are weak in the sense of being ambiguous, and
certain countries (most notably, the EU) exploited these ambiguities to their
advantage. In brief, the Article XXIV disciplines are weak partly by original design and partly by bad-faith of WTO members. WTO members have
failed to carry out their obligations in good faith with respect to RTAs. Article XXIV is not so ambiguous as to make compliance impossible. Members had their chances in eight rounds of negotiations to clarify Article
XXIV; they failed to do so. Accordingly, the blame should not be exclusively on the text itself or on the GATT Working Parties or their institutional successor, the CRTA. But, the consequence, of course, is clear: the
RTAs are frustratingly undisciplined. No effective mechanism exists to ensure that they are trade creating and do not disproportionately harm the interests of third countries.
Nonetheless, there is hope. The Uruguay Round Understanding on Ar-

ticle XXIV contains an explicit mandate to the WTO adjudicating bodies to
review RTA-related issues. The WTO cases like Turkey's Restrictions on
Textile and Canada-MeasuresAffecting Automotive Industry show that the

Appellate Body and the panels would critically examine any claim under
GATT Article XXIV. At least this emerging jurisprudence would put the
WTO members on alert not to abuse RTAs.
Would judicial pressure be sufficient? No, because almost all countries
are members of at least one RTA. Indeed, it is questionable whether WTO
members will use aggressively the DSU to "police" disciplines of Article
XXIV given that as RTA participants, they may find themselves constrained by new Article XXIV precedents. In the end, the responsibility of
ensuring proper discipline of RTAs lies with the WTO Members themselves. That means diplomatic pressure and self-restraint is required. True,
the CRTA is responsible for examining RTAs and making recommendations for their discipline, but the CRTA so far has failed to submit a single
report. Apparently, this is due to the interpretive problems associated with
Article XXIV, coupled with the requirement of having consensus on the reports.
It is indeed encouraging that in Doha, members took the mandate again
to improve disciplines on RTAs. They stated, "[W]e also agree to negotia-
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tions aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under
the existing WTO Provisions applying to regional trade agreements. The
negotiations shall take into account the developmental aspects of regional
trade agreements." 2 18 The Doha Round is certainly another opportunity to
ensure RTAs do not fragment the world trading system. The WTO members must reaffirm the oath they take in forming RTAs as enshrined in Article XXIV: 4; namely, "the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to
raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties." 219 Members must
take steps for necessary clarification of RTA- related provisions. It is not
the right answer for the members to ignore or exploit the weak RTA disciplines and leave it to the CRTA and the WTO adjudicating bodies to do all
of the disciplining.

218. Doha Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, WT/MIN(O 1)/DEC/i, para. 29 (Nov. 20,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0l e/mindecle.htm.
219. GATT Article XXIV: 4, supra note 17, at 231.

